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(Mis)Interpreting Vaclav Havel: Conviction and 






Abstract: This article examines Vaclav Havel’s alleged failure to understand the need for a 
“realistic” approach to post-communist politics and the criticisms of his insistence on 
retaining his principles and focus on morality in his conduct as president of Czechoslovakia 
in the early 1990s. It argues that these criticisms do not stand up against an examination 
either of how Havel actually behaved in this period or of his writings and statements 
concerning his actions and beliefs, that they are based on a misunderstanding of what Havel 
hoped to achieve as president, and make unjustified assumptions concerning the desirability 
of Western political and economic systems in the early post-communist period. This article 
seeks to clarify Havel’s perception of his role as president, of the goals of the revolution and 
what he personally hoped to achieve, and his understanding of the opportunity that had 
been offered to Czechoslovakia by the fall of the communist government. 
 





Over the course of a lifetime of dissident activity and opposition to the 
communist state in Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel developed, tested, and 
refined his ideas about the proper relationship between morality and politics. 
By the late 1980s, his thinking on these matters, and his determined 
adherence to his convictions and beliefs in the face of sustained harassment 
and repeated imprisonment by the Soviet-backed government, had won him 
respect and admiration from people around the world. It was this respect and 
admiration which led to his sudden, unexpected, and highly improbable 
election in December 1989 to the office of President of Czechoslovakia, 
something which Havel himself had thought was ‗out of the question‘ since the 
parliament which elected him was still dominated by ‗the previous regime‘.1 
Five years later, Havel summed up his conclusions about morality and politics 
in one short phrase: ‗Morality is omnipresent, and so is politics, and politics 
that dissociates itself from morality is simply bad politics‘.2 
 
                                                 
1 V. Havel, Address to a Joint Session of the US Congress, 21 February 1990, 
<http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html>, accessed on 4 February 2013. 
2 V. Havel, Catalonia International Prize Speech, 11 May 1995, 
<http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html>, accessed on 4 February 2013. 
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In making that statement, Havel demonstrated a continuity in his thinking 
that had survived the tumultuous changes that both he and his country went 
through in the early 1990s. But in ascending ‗from the Prison to the Castle‘3 in 
December 1989, Havel was forced to reconcile his ideas and his ideals about 
politics and morality, developed in opposition, with the practice of being a 
working politician, revolutionary, and national leader in circumstances of 
extreme uncertainty and fluidity. Havel‘s response to his new circumstances 
and responsibilities was entirely consistent with his past practices and beliefs: 
he continued to insist that morality had to be the basis of his beliefs, decisions, 
and actions as Czechoslovakia‘s president just as it had been during his life as 
a dissident. ‗The main problem faced by the country‘, he said a few days after 
becoming president, was the ‗contaminated moral atmosphere‘. But, he 
added, there was a solution to this problem. His revered predecessor Tomas 
Masaryk, president of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1935, had ‗based his 
politics on morality‘, and it was time, ‗in a new way, to restore this concept of 
politics‘.4  
 
Havel‘s insistence on this point has been derided as being counterproductive, 
naïve, and even potentially dangerous for the future of his country. Domestic 
and foreign critics of Havel‘s performance as president, and of developments 
in post-communist Czechoslovakia more widely, have argued that he should 
have adopted a new perspective, one based on the concept of politics as a 
matter of interests rather than morality. He should have set aside his 
principles in order to play the political game as it is normally played in the 
West, given up his insistence on remaining an ‗amateur‘ politician, and 
become a ‗professional‘.5 But the arguments that Havel failed to understand or 
simply refused to adopt such a supposedly ―realistic‖ approach to post-
communist politics, that he did not appreciate the importance of institution-
building and the need for ―professional‖ interest-based politics, do not stand 
up against an examination either of how Havel actually behaved in this period 
or of his writings and statements concerning his actions and beliefs.6 This 
article argues that there are two major flaws in such arguments: first, that they 
are based largely on a fundamental incomprehension of exactly what Havel 
personally was hoping to achieve in his role as President of his country and, 
second, that they make unjustified assumptions concerning the innate 
superiority and appeal of the political and economic systems found in the 
West and about their status as the inevitable, logical destination of the Velvet 
Revolution. This article seeks to clarify Havel‘s perception of his role as 
president, of the goals of the revolution and what he personally hoped to 
achieve, and his understanding of the opportunity that had been offered to 
Czechoslovakia by the fall of the communist government.  
                                                 
3 I. K. Naffziger, ‗From the Prison to the Castle: The Legacy of Vaclav Havel‘, Hoover Digest 2003 No. 1 
(January 30, 2003), <http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6684>, accessed 4 
February 2013. 
4 V. Havel, New Year’s Address to the Nation, 1 January 1990, 
<http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html>, accessed on 4 February 2013. 
5 Michael Simmons, The Reluctant President: A Political Life of Vaclav Havel, London, Methuen, 1991, 
pp. 191-2. 
6 There are of course those who argue that Havel demonstrated considerable political skill and ability; 
see, inter alia, Timothy J. Madigan, ‗Transcending Havel‘, Free Inquiry Fall, 1998, p. 9; Delia Popescu, 
Political Action in Vaclav Havel’s Thought: the Responsibility of Resistance, Lexington Books, Lanham, 
2012, p. 14. 
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Conviction or Responsibility? 
 
One of Havel‘s best-known ideas was what he called ‗anti-political politics‘, a 
concept which he developed as a dissident and described in his 1984 essay 
‗Politics and Conscience‘. Anti-political politics was politics not as the 
technology of power and manipulation, of cybernetic rule over humans or as 
the art of the utilitarian, but politics as one of the ways of seeking and 
achieving meaningful lives, of protecting them and serving them … politics as 
practical morality, as service to the truth, as essentially human and humanly 
measured care for our fellow humans.7 
Anti-political politics, in Havel‘s conception, involved what April Carter 
characterises as a ‗distrust of party politics‘ and sought ‗an alternative to the 
practice of Western liberal democracy‘.8 When asked in the first few months of 
his presidency about the ‗secret of politics‘, Havel replied ‗Write your own 
speeches and express hard truths in a polite way‘.9 Reflecting on his thinking 
after two years of high office, Havel confirmed the durability of the ideas he 
developed in ‗Politics and Conscience‘ when he wrote that Genuine politics is 
simply a matter of serving those around us: serving the community, and 
serving those who will come after us. Its deepest roots are moral because it is a 
responsibility, expressed through action, to and for the whole.10 
 
Havel‘s decision to apply these dissident-era principles to his conduct as 
president has often been taken as evidence that he did not properly 
understand his new environment, circumstances, and responsibilities. Ralf 
Dahrendorf, for example, suggests that the appropriate choice for Havel (or 
indeed anyone else) would have been to apply Max Weber‘s distinction 
between ‗an ―ethics of conviction‖ and an ―ethics of responsibility‖ … The 
former‘, he writes, ‗espouses absolute values; it is the morality of saints. The 
latter recognizes the complexity of means-ends relationships; it is the ethics of 
politicians‘.11 In spite of his stated admiration for Havel, Dahrendorf clearly 
believes that he was unable to make the shift from the mode of conviction to 
the mode of responsibility, and that his insistence on absolute values and 
beliefs, while appropriate or even necessary when used in opposition to 
totalitarianism, became an obstacle in the context of a pluralistic democratic 
society. Aviezer Tucker takes up the same theme, claiming that Havel‘s 
‗perfectionist virtue ethics of conviction...did not fit his new responsibilities‘.12 
From this perspective, Havel was essentially a prisoner of his dissident 
viewpoint, unable or unwilling to properly consider the possibility that he 
might need to change his approach and attitudes to suit the changed 
                                                 
7 V. Havel, ‗Politics and Conscience‘, February 1984, 
<http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=73_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML>, 
accessed on 4 February 2013. 
8 A. Carter, ‗Vaclav Havel: Civil Society, Citizenship and Democracy‘, in A. Carter, G. Stokes,(eds.), 
Liberal Democracy and its Critics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 58-59. 
9 P. C. Newman, ‗Saluting the playwright who became president‘, Maclean’s, Vol. 111, No. 33, 1998, p. 52. 
10 V. Havel, Summer Meditations on Politics, Morality and Civility in a Time of Transition, transl. Paul 
Wilson, London, Faber and Faber, 1992, pp. 5-6. 
11 R. Dahrendorf, After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society, New York, St. Martin‘s Press, 1997, 
p. 52.  
12 A. Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patocka to Havel, Pittsburgh, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, p. 17. 
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circumstances in which he found himself. There is, to be sure, some evidence 
for this to be found in Havel‘s own words. In 1992, for example, he wrote that, 
although [t]here may be some who won‘t believe me … in my second term as 
president in a land full of problems that presidents in stable countries never 
even dream of, I can safely say that I have not been compelled to recant 
anything of what I wrote earlier, or to change my mind about anything. It may 
seem incredible, but it is so: not only have I not had to change my mind, but 
my opinions have been confirmed.13 
 
In 2007, having spent time reading over old memos in the preparation of his 
book To the Castle and Back, Havel ‗realize[d] – and this is encouraging – 
that in fact I have always thought more or less the same way and worked … to 
achieve the same things‘.14 And for some, this was a positive thing: the 
playwright Friedrich Durrenmatt wrote in an open letter to Havel in 
December 1990 that his ‗mission as President is the same as the mission of 
Vaclav Havel, dissident‘.15 
However, for his critics, Havel‘s alleged lack of understanding of his proper 
role was supposedly demonstrated in a variety of ways. One of the most 
prominent accusations was that Havel lacked what Tucker describes as a 
―basic … understanding of the significance of institutions and the rule of law‖ 
which proved disastrous to the development of the post-communist 
Czechoslovak state and which ultimately led to the disintegration of the 
country in 1993.16 Institutions, in this context, mean virtually everything from 
the constitution to political parties to parliamentary procedure to a 
functioning free press. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan consider Havel‘s 
decision ‗not to try to form a statewide party‘ and his failure to ‗ask … the 
existing Federal Assembly to modify the constitution shortly after he was 
elected president‘ as key elements in Czechoslovakia‘s eventual dissolution.17  
 
Vaclav Zak, in his analysis of the ‗institutional foundations‘ of 
Czechoslovakia‘s dissolution, argues in general terms that since ‗[t]he 
coordination and pre-negotiation of political decisions that normally take 
place in political parties was weakened, and sometimes eliminated entirely … 
[the] coordination between institutions suffered‘ because few of the new 
leaders of the country ‗understood the necessity of pre-negotiating decisions, 
vital for formal relations between institutional representatives‘.18 More 
specifically, he argues that Havel‘s proposals concerning changing the 
country‘s official name (dropping the word ―Socialist‖) failed because he 
‗assumed that the deputies would pass his proposals on the spot. … he had not 
changed his conceptions about the leadership of an institution that is joined 
with other institutions by a range of procedural rules‘.19 
                                                 
13 Havel, Summer Meditations, op. cit., p. 10. 
14 V. Havel, To the Castle and Back, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 35. 
15 Quoted in Simmons, op. cit., p. 217. 
16 Tucker, op. cit., pp. 17, 205. 
17 J. J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 
331. For a broader discussion of all the elements they see as involved in Czechoslovakia‘s breakup, see 
pp. 329-333.  
18 V. Zak, ‗The Velvet Divorce – Institutional Foundations‘, in Jiri Musil, (ed.), The End of 
Czechoslovakia, Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995, p. 249. 
19 Ibid., p. 250. For Havel‘s perspective on this, see Summer Meditations, op. cit., p. 23; To the Castle 
and Back, op. cit., pp. 122-124. The criticisms of Havel in relation to the breakup of Czechoslovakia seem 
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The argument that the ―ethics of responsibility‖ were necessary (or at least 
more appropriate) in the post-Communist period is a perfectly legitimate one, 
but the contention that Havel was unable as president to adapt to the changed 
circumstances and adhered blindly to the ―ethics of conviction‖ does not stand 
up to an examination of the evidence. Certainly there was a period of learning 
and adaptation after his ascent from prison to the Castle, and there were 
frequent missteps and miscalculations. The vast differences between being a 
persecuted dissident and being president of Czechoslovakia made this 
inevitable. To expect a flawless transition from the one existence  to the other 
would indeed be unrealistic, particularly if one concedes that, as Martin 
Krygier points out, the early post-communist period consisted of ‗a series of 
unpredicted and unprecedented social experiments, on which there were no 
experts‘.20 Havel himself observed that while he tried to be ‗sober, down to 
earth, and cautious‘, he did sometimes ‗succumb … to the heady atmosphere 
of the time‘ and had ‗done things that a year later I would not have done and 
could not – and rightly so – have gotten away with‘.21  
 
Havel was well aware of the potential pitfalls of his ‗anti-political‘ approach to 
morality and politics, but he was not interested in presenting comforting 
fictions or in making political and social realities more palatable and less 
difficult than he felt they actually were. ‗I assume,‘ he said to his audience in 
his 1990 New Year‘s Address to the Nation, that ‗you did not propose me for 
this office so that I … would lie to you‘.22 So he began his presidential career by 
stating frankly the bald facts of the situation in Czechoslovakia as it appeared 
to him:  
 
Our country is not flourishing. The enormous creative and spiritual 
potential of our nations is not being used sensibly. Entire branches of 
industry are producing goods that are of no interest to anyone, while 
we are lacking the things we need. A state which calls itself a workers‘ 
state humiliates and exploits workers. Our obsolete economy is wasting 
the little energy we have available. A country that once could be proud 
of the educational level of its citizens spends so little on education that 
it ranks today as seventy-second in the world. We have polluted the 
soil, rivers and forests bequeathed to us by our ancestors, and we have 
today the most contaminated environment in Europe. Adults in our 
country die earlier than in most other European countries.23  
 
Speaking in this manner fit comfortably within Havel‘s dissident-era ideas 
about ―living in truth‖ and the importance of ‗reject[ing] the ritual and 
break[ing] the rules of the game‘ to ‗discover once more … [one‘s] suppressed 
                                                                                                                                           
in many respects to contradict each other. On the one hand, Linz and Stepan‘s argument almost suggests 
too great a respect for the institutions of the state as dictated by the communist-era constitution that 
was still in place. The majority of other critics argue that Havel simply didn‘t appreciate the importance 
of institutions at all. 
20 M. Krygier, ‗The Quality of Civility: Post-Anti-Communist Thoughts on Civil Society and the Rule of 
Law‘, in András Sajó, (ed.), Out of and Into Authoritarian Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2003, p. 222.  
21 Havel, To the Castle and Back, op. cit., p. 59. 
22 V. Havel, New Year’s Address to the Nation 1990, op. cit. 
23 Ibid.  
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identity and dignity‘ and ‗give [one‘s] freedom a concrete significance‘.24 It 
was certainly a dramatic change from the approach of his Communist 
predecessors, but Western audiences are not terribly accustomed to such 
candour from their elected officials either. 
 
At the same time, Havel fully understood the need at times for subtlety, 
nuance, and diplomacy: ‗in politics, as elsewhere in life, it is impossible and 
pointless to say everything, all at once, to just anyone. But that does not mean 
having to lie‘.25 What was needed, he argued, was ‗tact, the proper instincts, 
and good taste‘ to know what to say, when, to whom, and how.26 For his 1990 
New Year‘s Address, he actively decided that brutal frankness was appropriate 
and necessary; he did not somehow fail to understand that politicians are not 
supposed to speak in such terms. But he approached other issues very 
differently. For instance, it has become a sort of common knowledge that, as 
one interviewer put it in 2009, ‗at the beginning of [his] presidency [Havel] 
apologized for the displacement of Germans‘ from the Sudetenland after 
World War II.27 Havel, according to another commentator, ‗believed that 
politics and foreign policy could only be conducted with outstanding moral 
wrongs righted, which included an apology for the expulsion‘.28 But as Havel 
himself pointed out, ‗it‘s not exactly right‘ to say that he ‗apologized for the 
displacement‘; what he said was that ‗we should somehow apologize‘.29 He 
later wrote that ‗I didn‘t offer an apology, either on my own behalf or on the 
state‘s behalf. I merely said that a Czechoslovak apology would be a good 
thing‘.30 The distinction has been lost on many, but it was an effective and 
diplomatic way to bring the subject up without officially addressing it as 
president. 
 
Havel‘s reaction to the situation of Jan Kavan in 1991 and 1992 also 
demonstrated his ability to be nuanced and thoughtful in his political 
behaviour as president. Kavan, at the time a member of parliament and a 
long-time dissident himself (it was through his publishing company, Palach 
Press, that much of Havel‘s work was first made available in the West), was 
publicly accused in March 1991 of being a communist-era informant of the 
communist secret police, the StB. Ultimately, he became a target of the 
lustration law passed in October of the same year.31 Kavan‘s background and 
                                                 
24 V. Havel, ‗The Power of the Powerless‘, October 1978, 
http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML, accessed 
on 4 February 2013. 
25 Havel, Summer Meditations, op. cit., pp. 10-11.  
26 Ibid., p. 11.  
27 ‗Still Searching for Answers: A discussion with Vaclav Havel and Richard von Weizsäcker‘, German 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1 November 2009, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/still-
searching-answers, accessed on 4 February 2013. 
28 R. Fawn, ‗Symbolism in the Diplomacy of Czech President Vaclav Havel‘, East European Quarterly 
XXXIII, No. 1 (March 1999), p. 5. Jan Pauer describes it as a ‗publicly expressed … moral apology‘; 
‗Moral Political Dissent in German-Czech Relations‘, Czech Sociological Review, 1998, Vol. 6 (No. 2), p. 
173. 
29 ‗Still Searching for Answers…‘, op. cit. 
30 Havel, To the Castle and Back, op. cit., p. 139. See also Vaclav Havel, The Visit of German President 
Richard von Weizsacker, March 15, 1990, http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html, 
accessed on 4 February 2013; Keane, op. cit., pp. 467-469. 
31 For more on the Czech lustration law, see A. Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye, New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 90-91; Keane, op. cit., pp. 428-433, D. W. Stewart & C. V. 
Stewart (1995): ‗Lustration in Poland and the former Czechoslovakia: a study in decommunization‘, 
International Journal of Public Administration, 18:6 (1995), pp. 889-906; R. David, 'Lustration Laws in 
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prominence meant that the case was widely reported internationally, and his 
past association with Havel meant that the president‘s actions in the case were 
the subject of considerable attention and discussion. Given Havel‘s public 
opposition to lustration, which he feared was becoming little more than 
‗lawless revenge and witch-hunts‘,32 and his personal associations with Kavan, 
many observers felt that he could not possibly ‗remain silent now‘.33 But Havel 
did not take a strong public position concerning the attacks on Kavan. Instead, 
he met with Kavan and told him that, while he was certain the allegations 
were false, the issue was too politicized for him to take a public stance on it. 
The political repercussions would be too great, given the high emotions stirred 
up by the case.34 Keane portrays this as a ‗farewell to his old noble habit of 
drawing black-and-white distinctions between ―truth‖ and ―lies‖‘ and as a 
cynical means of securing his own position and power in the state.35 It could 
equally be seen as recognition that the ―ethics of conviction‖ were in fact not 
always appropriate in the new Czechoslovakia.  
 
Far from being trapped in his past, the Kavan episode and others demonstrate 
that Havel was able and willing to apply the ―ethics of responsibility‖ when he 
believed it was called for.36 Of course, a crucial element in the debate over how 
to assess whether Havel‘s actions stemmed from ‗conviction‘ or ‗responsibility‘ 
is the fact that there is no clear delineation between the two concepts. From 
Havel‘s perspective, indeed, there may have been no dividing line at all, with 
‗conviction‘ being the source of goals and intentions and ‗responsibility‘ being 
the ways and means to achieve the intended ends. For the purposes of this 
argument, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that the deciding whether or not 
Havel was unable or unwilling to apply the ‗ethics of responsibility‘ is a highly 
subjective process which does not yield the definite answers offered by Havel‘s 
critics. Moreover, as the next section argues, this process is greatly affected by 
what one thinks the goals and intentions are in any given situation. 
 
The Teleology of Transition 
 
Havel‘s critics often do not appear to concede the experimental nature of the 
period of transition from communism to post-communism,37 which inevitably 
complicates the debate over the ethics which he employed as president. 
Instead, many observers and commentators, both at the time and since, see 
the period not as one of experimentation but as one of transition to a 
predetermined goal. From this perspective, the intended and proper outcome 
of the Velvet Revolution (and the other revolutions in central and eastern 
Europe) was the establishment of Western-style liberal democracy and so-
called free market capitalism.38 But this view was not shared by all of the 
                                                                                                                                           
Action: the Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001)‘, 
Law & Social Inquiry (2003), pp. 392-410. 
32 Quoted in Keane, op. cit., p. 433. 
33 ‗A Witch Hunt in Prague?‘, New York Times, 6 April 1991. See also Aryeh Neier, ‗Watching Rights‘, 
The Nation, 6/13 January 1992, p. 9. 
34 Keane, op. cit., p. 435 (recounting information from an interview with Jan Kavan in 1997). 
35 Keane, op. cit., pp. 435-436.  
36 As for the lustration law itself, Havel reluctantly signed it and then immediately called for a variety of 
amendments to mitigate its effects (none of which were passed); see Keane, op. cit., pp. 433-436.   
37 See above, footnote 22. 
38 J. C. Isaac, Democracy in Dark Times, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 156-158.  
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actual participants in the events in question,39 and it was emphatically not the 
view of Havel himself. This is an important point because the ―correctness‖ or 
―incorrectness‖ of Havel‘s political, moral, and ethical choices vary depending 
on the observer‘s point of view. The balance between conviction and 
responsibility looks very different when Havel‘s actions are assessed from his 
own perspective rather than that of his critics. If Havel is judged on the basis 
of his writings and his actions, he clearly did learn from and adapt to his new 
situation, modifying or rejecting concepts and behaviours which proved in 
practice to be counterproductive, however effective they might have been 
during his life as a dissident.  
 
For example, according to Jan Urban, a prominent member of the Civic 
Forum movement and a former Charter 77 dissident himself, ‗Havel never 
understood the value of institutions, negotiations, and the need for 
compromise‘; instead, he was ‗always about making direct deals, personal 
compromises, and … manipulation‘.40 Urban goes on to claim that while these 
tactics may have been suitable for small, relatively impotent opposition 
groups, they were completely inappropriate to the practice of politics as 
president: ‗[they] most certainly never worked during the first months of his 
presidency, when power was seen simply as manipulation‘.41 This accusation 
has been repeated from many different quarters. April Carter writes ‗that he 
has been reluctant to address institutional questions and organizational power 
[and] ‗tends to be somewhat imprecise about institutions‘.42 Petr Pithart, 
prime minister of the Czech Republic from early 1990 to mid-1992, argued in 
1996 that ‗[a]s a president with few powers, Havel ought to demonstrate the 
importance of properly functioning institutions, and of respect for the rules of 
the game, the constitution, and the legal system‘.43 Pithart condemned Havel 
for what showing what he described as a ‗negative attitude toward anything 
that resembled a party‘ while Urban disapprovingly commented on Havel‘s 
decision to ‗declare … himself a non-partisan President above any political 
parties‘.44 John Keane identifies in Havel a ‗hoary prejudice against 
parliament‘ and questions whether he ‗really wanted to allow the development 
of a parliamentary democratic system of government‘.45 According to Zdenek 
Jicinsky, a sometime political opponent of Havel in the early 1990s, Havel‘s 
‗limited familiarity with the constitutional relationships in which he was 
acting‘ meant that he did not ‗respect the institution of parliament‘.46  
 
To put these criticisms in context, Havel‘s power as president of 
Czechoslovakia was distinctly limited. Under the existing (communist) 
constitution, the president was the country‘s chief diplomatic representative 
and the convenor of the Federal Assembly. His signature was required to 
                                                 
39 Tucker, op. cit., pp. 162-164, 186-187.  
40 Quoted in J. Keane, Vaclav Havel: a Political Tragedy in Six Acts, London, Bloomsbury, 1999, p. 403. 
The contradiction between claiming that Havel did not understand the need for compromise and then 
stating that he frequently made ‗personal compromises‘ is neither explained nor clarified. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Carter, op. cit., p. 71. 
43 V. Havel & V. Klaus, with commentary by Petr Pithart, ‗Civil Society after Communism: Rival Visions‘, 
Journal of Democracy Vol.7, No. 1, January 1996, p. 22. 
44 Both quoted in Linz & Stepan, op. cit., pp. 331-332. 
45 Keane, op. cit., pp. 422, 419. 
46 Quoted in Ibid., p. 422. To  
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bring laws into force, he was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and 
had the power to appoint and remove the premier and certain other officials. 
Havel himself saw this as a problem, and as early as 29 June 1990 he 
proposed to the Federal Assembly ‗that the Office of the President should 
become a ―real political office‖ [where previously] it had offered ―a 
bureaucratic, ceremonial service‖‘. He specifically mentioned the 
‗underdeveloped‘ state of its ‗political functions‘, and suggested that its ‗role 
should be one of ensuring contact between the President … and other 
constitutional figures, parliament, the government, political parties, foreign 
institutions, and Czechoslovak citizens‘.47 It is not hard to see how this vision 
of the role of the president fit with his decision to remain unaffiliated with any 
political party mentioned above. 
 
Underlying these criticisms is the widespread idea that the construction and 
strengthening of institutions – and more specifically, Western-style political 
and economic institutions – is ‗the most important single task‘ to be 
accomplished in the post-communist period, because it is ‗institutions which 
give [liberty] stability and duration‘.48 ‗Liberal democracy‘, writes Jeffrey 
Isaac, ‗is the order of the day … it is impossible to question the attractions of 
liberal constitutionalism‘.49 And if constructing liberal democratic institutions 
is the most important task at hand, then it logically follows that any action 
which does not contribute directly to such institution-building is at best a 
needless distraction and at worst an actual obstacle to the accomplishment of 
that task.50 If an action can be seen as being disruptive to the construction of 
western-style structures and institutions, it has been, virtually by definition, 
considered to be incorrect. 
 
The discomfort felt by many commentators whenever President Havel insisted 
on addressing moral or ethical issues such as the post-World War II expulsion 
of the Sudeten Germans, discussed above, was in large part because such 
actions did not fit the conception that post-communist politicians should be 
concentrating on institutions, on facts and figures, on interests and politicking 
– in a word, on ―reality‖. Since by ―normal‖ standards there were no politically 
valid reasons for Havel as president of Czechoslovakia to even bring up this 
issue, let alone to suggest that an apology was called for, it was seen as being 
counterproductive and obstructionist to the presumed goal of constructing 
institutions. He was not playing his assigned ―role‖ as president. But the idea 
that this ―failure‖ might be a matter of choice rather than ignorance was not 
given much attention. But for Havel, nationhood and government involved 
moral and ethical issues as well as practical ones. Therefore, he felt that it was 
perfectly rational and indeed necessary to bring up his country‘s treatment of 
                                                 
47 J. Pehe, ‗Office of the President Reorganized‘, 3 August 1990, p. 1, <www.pehe.cz/clanky/1990/1990-
3aAugust1990-RFERL.pdf>, accessed on 3 July 2013. Though beyond the scope of this article, it would 
be interesting to examine Havel‘s attitudes and actions with regard to the power and role of the 
presidency through the prism of parliamentary and presidential democratic political systems. Do his 
attempts to increase the role of the president suggest a preference for a presidential system in which the 
presidency has a major or even dominant role in the political life of the country? Or, conversely, does his 
emphasis on morality in cases such as the Sudeten Germans suggest an effort to lift the presidency above 
party politics and into a more symbolic role, a possibility which necessarily implies the elevation of 
parliament to the leading role in post-communist Czechoslovakia‘s nascent democracy? 
48 Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 56.  
49 Isaac, op. cit., pp. 156-157. 
50 Ibid., p. 156.  
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the Sudeten Germans. He was already hinting at this in his 1990 New Year‘s 
Address when he observed that ―self-confidence is not pride. Just the 
contrary: only a person or a nation that is self-confident, in the best sense of 
the word, is capable of listening to others, accepting them as equals, forgiving 
its enemies and regretting its own guilt. Let us try to introduce this kind of 
self-confidence into the life of our community and, as nations, into our 
behavior on the international stage. Only thus can we restore our self-respect 
and our respect for one another as well as the respect of other nations.51 
 
The point, according to Havel, was to have ‗matter-of-fact and utterly 
unbiased reflection … to alleviate the consequences of a wretched event…. evil 
begets evil and … we too had begun to resettle our nationalities, to ethnically 
cleanse our country‘.52 
 
More broadly, the suggestion that Havel either did not comprehend or did not 
care about the construction of stable, lasting institutions in the Western 
mould simply does not stand up to an examination of his own writings and 
speeches. In his New Year‘s Address to the Nation in 1991, he compiled a list 
of accomplishments that Czechoslovakia had achieved over the last year; no 
fewer than five out of nine points concerned the establishment of legitimate, 
stable institutions and structures in the country: ‗the first free elections in 
forty-two years‘, the work of the new parliament to ‗create the first 
foundations of a truly legal, democratic and decentralized state‘, the 
establishment of ‗full freedom of speech and expression … and freedom of 
assembly and association‘, the adoption of ‗some significant economic laws, 
which will form the legal framework for [economic] reform‘, and the 
beginnings of ‗a true and viable federation‘, including especially the ‗recently 
adopted constitutional law, which divides executive powers between the two 
constituent republics and the federation‘.53 Several points outlining the tasks 
for the next year involved similar issues, including the need for ‗three new 
constitutions [at the federal and republic levels] … which would become a 
solid and durable basis for our entire new legal order‘, the dismantling of 
‗[l]arge, inflexible and bureaucratic organizations in the trade and service 
sector‘, and the need for a clear strategic conception … at the government level 
… in the social sector, where it is necessary to create promptly … a safety net of 
legislative and administrative measures to forestall the unjust and inhumane 
consequences of economic reform.54  
 
At the same time, the experiences of Czechoslovakia under communism made 
it clear to him that institutions as such were not in and of themselves a 
sufficient basis for a viable democratic system. They were susceptible to abuse 
and manipulation if they were not connected to considerations of morality, 
ethics, fairness, and social justice55 – an idea which is clearly expressed in his 
call for a safety net to mitigate the negative effects of the needed economic 
reforms. 
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52 Havel, To the Castle and Back, op. cit., p. 140. 
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Havel‘s opposition to the lustration bill passed by parliament in October 1991 
is another case which demonstrates his willingness to acknowledge the role 
and power of institutions whilst attempting to temper their power with reason 
and justice. Havel opposed the lustration law on the grounds that ‗the 
legislation is based on the principle of collective responsibility … It prohibits 
certain persons solely because they belonged to groups defined by their 
external characteristics. It does not allow their cases to be heard individually. 
This runs counter to the basic principles of democratic law‘.56 He felt 
constrained to sign the bill in order to avoid the potential crisis of a 
confrontation between the presidency and the parliament, but after he had 
done so, he announced his intention to seek amendments to the legislation in 
order to remedy its worst defects.57 His appreciation for the importance of 
institutions is clear: he acknowledged the right of parliament to pass laws, saw 
the danger of an open clash between the two branches of government, and 
worked within his own presidential role to improve the outcome.  
 
Havel did sometimes try to work around institutions, precisely because his 
appreciation of their uses and importance did not blind him to the potential 
for abuse that was inherent within them. The clearest example of this was 
during the period before the so-called ―Velvet Divorce‖ of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia during 1992 and 1993. Although the separation has often been 
described as having been driven by popular demand from the public in the 
two republics, in actual fact it seems to have been driven more by conflicts 
between politicians, in particular Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, the Czech 
and Slovak prime ministers respectively. The general public seems to have 
been overwhelmingly against separation; at the least, it was felt that the 
question should be decided by a referendum rather than by politicians.58 
Havel, who repeatedly clashed with Klaus throughout the nineties,59 did his 
best to bring facilitate public input and influence on the situation by what 
Tucker disapprovingly describes as ―extraparliamentary means;‖ calling for 
public demonstrations and presenting bills to parliament which would have 
allowed for referenda, among other changes to federal law.60 To purists, this 
was an unforgivable sin; for Havel it was simply an attempt to apply morality 
to the practice of politics. Rather than an attempt to intimidate parliament, as 
Tucker implies, public demonstrations were a means of encouraging and 
sustaining direct participation by the citizens61 in decisions which profoundly 
affected them. Simply because parliament had the technical authority to 
pursue the course towards separation did not make it right for it to do so; 
especially when the people it was supposedly representing had made it very 
clear that they did not support that course of action. The only ‗constitutional 
                                                 
56 Havel speaking at NYU, 27 October 1991; quoted in Keane, op. cit., p. 434. 
57 Ibid., p. 434. See also Stewart & Stewart, p. 891; Tim McCarthy, ‗Growing Up or Selling Out? Czechs 
Face the Future‘, Commonweal, 24 September 1993, pp. 14-15. 
58 Linz and Stepan op. cit., pp. 328-330.  
59 Keane, op. cit., pp. 441-447.  
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and moral‘ solution, Havel argued, was to hold a referendum,62 a position 
which remained popular throughout the Czech and Slovak regions of the 
country even after the June 1992 elections.63 It should be noted how this 
approach to the crisis reflected Havel‘s views on the role of the presidency as 
he articulated them in mid-1990, wherein he saw the presidency almost as a 
sort of ombudsman, maintaining ‗contact‘ amongst the diverse parties 
involved in Czechoslovak society, including (to list those parties most relevant 
in this debate) ‗the President … parliament, the government, political parties, 
… and Czechoslovak citizens‘.64 
 
This is not to argue that those who emphasize the importance of the 
establishment of stable institutions are incorrect, or that Havel‘s approach 
was necessarily correct or even effective. But criticisms of his actions on these 
grounds are largely based on the assumption that the construction of 
Western-style institutions was the goal, which should have come before all 
else. Havel had a different conception of both the value and role of 
institutions. He did not believe that institutions in the western mould were 
automatically ―accountable … [and] responsive to claims of justice.‖65 As a 
result, he could not and would not give them unquestioning support and 
attention. They were not the overriding goal of his presidency or, more 
broadly, of the transition from communism to something else in the aftermath 
of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. Havel opposed what he called 
‗blind imitation, especially if it becomes an ideology‘.66 While he agreed that it 
made no sense to ‗reinvent the wheel‘ in terms of the basic elements and 
institutions of national life, he argued that ‗this sentiment [can become] a kind 
of hickory stick to crack across the knuckles of anyone who does not want, for 
whatever reason, to copy faithfully all the models presented - which today, of 
course, are western models‘.67 Czechoslovakians, he argued, needed to ‗find 
[them]selves anew‘; they were looking for ‗a new, better and truly just model 
for [their] existence as a state, and for the coexistence of the nations that live 
within that state‘.68 This process, he said on New Year‘s Day 1992, was 
underway: ‗parliamentary democracy is beginning to work … the political 
spectrum is rapidly crystallizing, and political parties are forming … The 
political scene is mercilessly monitored by a free press‘.69 But while he was 
‗delighted that it is happening‘, he identified problems with the process – 
‗politicking, party squabbles, mutual accusations, malice, and at times even ill 
will and intrigue‘ – that are part and parcel of Western political and civil life. 
He insisted on the need ‗in the somewhat chaotic provisional activity around 
the technical aspects of building the state‘ to ‗occasionally … remind ourselves 
of the meaning of the state, which is, and must remain, truly human‘, and to 
remain aware of ‗what can happen to even a decent law in the hands of an 
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unscrupulous judge, and how easily unscrupulous people can use democratic 
institutions to introduce dictatorship and terror‘.70  
 
What exactly this ‗new, better and truly just model‘ for the new state might 
have looked like is unclear. Havel himself devoted an entire chapter entitled 
‗Beyond the Shock of Freedom‘ to his vision of a new society in Summer 
Meditations, but he admitted at the very start that he ‗cannot … leap over the 
hard years that lie ahead and look into our future‘, so he could only ‗dream for 
a while‘.71 It is nevertheless instructive to see what he envisioned. It included 
‗two large [political] parties with their own traditions … intellectual potential, 
clear programs, and … grassroots support‘, along with ‗several smaller 
parties‘.72 He goes on to outline what he describes as ‗a stable Central 
European democracy that has found its identity and learned to live with 
itself‘.73 The state would be ‗highly decentralized‘, and local rather than 
national or parliamentary elections and issues would be most important to 
people.74 There would be a rich and diverse civil society, with an array of 
‗local, regional, and state-wide clubs, organizations, and associations with a 
wide variety of aims and purposes [which] will be so complex that it will 
difficult to map thoroughly‘.75 This is all rather vague and, at least on the 
surface, not incompatible with the systems which are found in the West, so 
exactly how Havel hoped Czechoslovakia would be different is open to debate. 
 
Conclusion: Havel’s Vision of the Presidency 
 
Havel and his critics had very different conceptions of his role as president. 
His critics saw traditional western liberal democracy as not simply a likely or 
welcome outcome, but as the intended outcome of the revolutions of 1989.76 
Writing in 1992, Havel defined his role as ‗help[ing] this country move from 
totalitarianism to democracy, from satellitehood to independence, from a 
centrally directed economy to market economics.‘77 At the same time, he 
criticized the purists of market economics as suffering from one of the same 
faults as orthodox Marxists: the certainty that operating from a theory is 
essentially smarter than operating from a knowledge of life, and that 
everything that goes against theoretical precepts , that cannot be made to 
conform to them, or that goes beyond them, is, by definition, worthy only of 
rejection.78 
 
This belief of Havel‘s is crucial for understanding of his behaviour as president 
of his country. It is not the case that he was trapped in an outdated dissident 
perspective on the world, unable to adapt to his new environment and the new 
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concerns that came with it. Nor is it true that he did not value or wish to see 
developed stable institutions such as those found in the West. As he noted to 
the US Congress in early 1990, he was ‗speaking … as the representative of a 
country which has complete freedom of speech, which is preparing for free 
elections, and which seeks to establish a prosperous market economy and its 
own foreign policy‘ – a description which was hardly a full-throated 
condemnation of Western-style institutions.79  
 
Havel argued strongly that those things were not sufficient in and of 
themselves:80 that institutions established on purely functional grounds, on a 
devotion to structures, theory, and interests were in a very basic and essential 
way deficient as a structure for the new, more human – more truthful – 
society which he hoped to see develop in Czechoslovakia after the fall of 
Communism. He opposed the domination of systems over people, and hoped 
for something more than an imitation of the West to emerge in 
Czechoslovakia after 1989.81 This is not a concept which is easy to express, 
though he wrote and spoke about it many times over the years in a continuing 
effort to clarify his views. It is also not a concept which is popular amongst the 
politicians and political scientists of the world, who prefer to believe that 
politics are just about interests, and that ―most political questions are 
technical, questions of means rather than ends, and [that] philosophy has 
little or nothing to contribute.‖82 Vaclav Havel clearly disagreed with that 
premise. Without understanding that disagreement, the goals towards which 
Havel worked cannot be properly recognized; without recognizing his goals, it 
is impossible to correctly interpret his actions. 
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